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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
In conformity with the provisions of Rule 24 (d) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Appellants
[JOHN F GREEN and LARUE GREEN] are referred to herein
as "the Sellers" and the Appellees

[WESLEY CLOCK and

ANNE CLOCK] are referred to herein as "the Buyers".

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Sellers are entitled to an award of

"interest", at the 10 1/2% rate which the
"option agreement" clearly provides . The Court
of

Appeals

considering

the

properly-

perfected "appeal" of the 1998 "judgment"
should award that "interest", as the parties
contemplated and as the "option agreement"
provides. The Buyers should not

particularly

by reason of their own failure to pay the
monies

when

required

be

entitled

to

a

"windfall" (i.e. no interest accrues, against
either the contract purchase price
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or the

judgment arising from the contract) when they
have agreed otherwise!
2.

The

Sellers'

present

appeal

is

meritorious. The Buyers have not been harmed
in any way by this "appeal". The vesting of
title occurred

(or could have occurred), in

accordance with the express provisions of the
1998

"judgment"

(framed

and decided

after

almost two years of subsequent litigation, on
remand

after

the appeal)

Buyers

deposited

at

the

time

the

the purchase monies. The

award of attorney's fees, not provided for in
the written contract, is inappropriate.
ARGUMENT
I
THE SELLERS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF INTEREST
AGAINST THEIR FORBEARANCE AND UPON THE JUDGMENT
The Buyers argue that the Sellers are not entitled
to an award of interest. The Sellers claim they are so
entitled.
The Buyers' arguments and position (i.e. that the
Sellers are not entitled to an award of interest) are
flawed, for several reasons.
The Buyers' entire case
entitlements thereunder

their claims and their

is foundationed upon the 1991

"option agreement". That "option agreement" provides in
3

its entirety:
7-29-1991
I Wesley Clock and Anne Clock agree to pay
$675.00 per month Plus Sewer and water. There
is a $350.00 deposit plus $1,000 for a lease
option to buy. Starting July 29, 1991 prorated
to Aug. 4, 1991, the selling price to be
$81500 at 10 1/2% interest. When option is
picked up, the $3 5 0. 0 0 plus the $1, 0 0 0. 0 0 will
be applied to the down Payment of $5,000 or
more. The Seller will re-roof and make the
carport into a double garage, replace the back
door. Other than the things above, the Clocks
will take care of any repairs during the
option period. There will be a balloon payment
due on the balance of the loan Aug 5, 1996.
The rent to be pro-rated from July 29, 1991 to
Aug 4, 1991. Rent to begin on Aug 5, 1991.
August 2, $500.00; Aug 5, $7 0 0.00. Balance by
Aug 20, 1991. If the Clocks do not buy they
will be renters and Money will not be
refunded.
/s/ Anne Clock
/s/ Wesley Clock
/s/ John F. Green
/s/ LaRue Green
Emphasis added. [RECORD at 0005 and 0042.] [A photocopy
of the Agreement is included in Seller's original Brief
as ADDENDUM

#1.] It is this written agreement which

gives the parties their rights AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS
thereunder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
have found and adjudicated that the "option agreement"
was enforceable until August 1996 and that the Buyers
attempted to exercise their rights under the "option"
prior to its expiration. The trial court ruled against
the Sellers in their claim that the Buyers had
before 1996

years

breached the agreement; that ruling was
4

implicitly affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Neither

court

expressly

ruled

upon

the

provisions

contained within the "option agreement" pertaining to
the "purchase price of $81,500 at 10 1/2% interest" as
clearly contained within the "option agreement".
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code, provides:
(1) The
parties
to
a
lawful
contract may agree upon any rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods or chose in
action that is the subject of their
contract.
(2) Unless parties
to a lawful
contract specify a different rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest
for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action
shall be 1 0 % per annum.
Emphasis added. Section 15-1-3, Utah Code, provides:
Whenever in any statute or deed, or
written or verbal contract, or in any public
or private instrument whatever, any certain
rate of interest is mentioned and no period of
time is stated, interest shall be calculated
at the rate mentioned by the year.
Emphasis added.
In

the

agreement

instant

specifies

situation,
"10

1/2%

the

"lease-option"

interest".

It

is

reasonable to construe the contract that the "selling
price" is to be adjusted by that amount.

[Whether the

transaction is also characterized as a "loan" probably
doesn't matter. What does matter is that the Agreement
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clearly contains the provision and, in light of the
contract construction principles identified in Point I
of Sellers original Brief, the provision MUST BE GIVEN
SOME MEANING AND EFFECT!]
Section 15-1-4, Utah Code, provides:
(1) Any
judgment
rendered
on a
lawful
contract shall conform to the contract and
shall bear
interest
agreed upon by the
parties, which shall be specified in the
judgment.
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at
the federal postjudgment interest rate as of
January 1 of each year, plus 2%.
Emphasis added.
A
INTEREST ACCRUING AGAINST
PRE-1996 FORBEARANCE AND OBLIGATION
As noted, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals

directly

ruled on the issue. The procedural

context in which the appeal arose and the conflicting
views of the parties were such that the issue

simply

was not raised in the first appeal. Thus, it strains
credibility to state (as the Buyers do) that the matter
was decided and has thus become "the law of the case".
The Court of Appeals simply did not adjudicate the
issue.

Thus,

we are not presented

with

a

situation

wherein the Court is being requested to re-examine an
issue

which

has already

been

6

decided.

The

interest

issue was simply NOT decided.
B
INTEREST ACCRUING AGAINST
POST-1996 FORBEARANCE AND OBLIGATION
Even if the September

1996

"ORDER

& JUDGMENT"

entered by the trial court failed to include the award
of

"interest"

accruing

prior

to

that

time,

then

certainly the judgment ought to bear interest as a
"matter of law", as previously declared by case law
decision [Dairy Farmers] and by statute [Section 15-14, Utah Code]
If this is not the case, then the Court is ignoring
a major provision of the "option agreement" and that's
not fair! The

"interest" provision

"at 10 l/2%" is

something the Buyers agreed to! The Buyers cannot now
be heard to complain that the very "option agreement"
which

they

have

been

so

strident

about

enforcing

according to its terms is ENFORCED AGAINST THEM (THE
BUYERS) , in the same manner! If such is not done, then
the Court is not enforcing the contract as written.
The post-1996 "interest" is a substantial sum: by
September 1999

three years after the September 1996

"judgment" was first entered by the trial court and
about the time the case will be heard by the Court of
Appeals

the interest will be approximately $24,000!

[3 years x 10.5% per year x 76,500 unpaid balance =
7

$24,097.50. The Record is unclear whether the $3650
deposited

"into court" was ever released

to Surety

Title Company. The foregoing calculation nevertheless
gives the Buyers "credit" for such transfer as though
it had been timely made.] Apparently, the Buyers too
feel

that

such

intentionally

is

failed

a

sizeable

to

"close"

sum:
on

they

the

have

purchase,

pending resolution of the appeal. [As noted in Point
II, below, the 1998 "judgment" of the trial court
from which

this

"second appeal"

is taken does NOT

prevent the Buyers from closing. In fact, the vesting
of title in the names of the Buyers is not conditioned
upon the Sellers doing anything. The vesting can occur,
as a matter of law, as soon as the Buyers will pay to
the

title

company

the

remainder

of

the

purchase

monies.] That they have waited now over three years
(from

the

time

they

first

sought

to

exercise

option) certainly should invoke the payment
"interest"

the

of the

the interest at the rate stated in the

contract which they signed! Th$ Buyers have not only
had full use of their money for those three years; they
have also had full use of the property!
The District Court initially adjudicated the case
pursuant to jointly-filed motions for summary judgment.
The Buyers moved for summary judgment on the basis of
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their averments that they (as Buyers) had presented a
notice of intent to exercise the "option" within a
timely fashion. The Sellers moved for summary judgment
in

their

favor

on

the

basis

that

the

Buyers'

notification was defective, in that the Buyers were in
breach of the agreement because they had failed to make
the required down payment and because the option was
not exercised in a timely manner. The specific issue of
the price to be paid
interest"

phrase

as required by the "at 10 1/2%
was

NOT

directly

raised

or

adjudicated. The District Court ruled in favor of the
Buyers. The Sellers appealed. The Utah Supreme Court
"poured-over" the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals,
which issued an unpublished opinion, affirming the
District Court's judgment in favor of the Buyers. The
Utah Supreme Court ultimately denied the Defendant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Following the filing of the first appeal, the
Buyers (as purchasers) took no action to comply with
provisions of the agreement concerning the exercise of
the "option" and/or the Court's judgment upholding the
option and its exercise. The Buyers tendered no money
to the Sellers, although they continued to reside upon
the premises.
On remand, the District Court

9

over the objection

of the

Sellers

entered

judgment

in

favor

of

the

Buyers, automatically quieting title to the real estate
in the name of the Buyers, upon their deposit with the
title company of the "option" price. The "at 10 1/2%
interest" clause (pertaining to the purchase price) was
given

NO

judgment

EFFECT

by

the

trial

court.

This

latter

which is the basis of the instant appeal

failed to take into account the provisions of agreement
concerning the "at 10 1/2% interest" as such affected
(i.e. increased) the purchase price. The District Court
also

seemingly

ignored

the

contractual

provisions

characterizing the purchase transaction as a "loan".
The major flaw in the Buyers' argument [that the
appeal

(or that the appellate consideration of this

issue) is time-barred] is that the argument ignores all
of the facts and the procedural history of this case.
In the first instance, the Court of Appeals did NOT
rule on the "interest issue". [A careful reading of the
abbreviated "memorandum decision" confirms this fact.]
Before the Court of Appeals were simply a couple of
conflicting issues: the Buyers asserted that they were
entitled

to

enforce

the

"option"

Sellers

as original appellants

agreement.

The

responded that the

"option" was not exercisable, due to the fact that it
was not exercised in a timely fashion. The original
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appeal followed from a decision of the district court
in a "summary judgment" setting. On appeal, the Sellers
argued that there were genuine issues of material fact
to preclude summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
determined otherwise. The "interest" issue was not
presented to the Court of Appeals, because it was not
an issue at the time. In the minds of the parties (and
their counsel) , THE issue concerning the appeal was the
appropriateness of the summary judgment disposition and
the

terms

of

the

"option",

not

the

judgment.

Furthermore, as indicated below, the judgment should
have incorporated the "interest" provisions of the
"option" agreement, as a matter of law

[per Dairy

Distributors, infra] , whether the judgment said so or
not.
The Court of Appeals decision

a

Decision" designated "not for publication"

"Memorandum
is brief

and to the point: to resolve the "option" issue and
that's it.
The

cases

cited

by

Buyers

are

generally

inapplicable to the case at bar. The Sellers' reliance
upon Schoney vs Memorial Estates, Incorporated, 8 63
P.2d 59 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993), is misplaced.
Schoney involved a second appeal where the issue was
thoroughly litigated, by both the trial court AND the
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appellate court; such is not the case at bar.
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Dairy Distributors, Incorporated vs Local Union 97 6,
Joint Council 87, Western Conference of Teamsters, to
be directly on point and to be controlling. In Dairy
Distributors the Utah Supreme Court wrote:
[cited, but omitted, cases] . . . will be
found to actually support plaintiff' s position
in recognizing that the interest follows the
judgment as a matter of law.
Our statute, Sec. 15-1-4, Utah Code Ann.
1953, provides that unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, » * * * judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of eight per cent per
annum." This interest follows the judgment as
a matter of law and would be collectible even
though the judgment did not so provide. See
Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d 260 (6th Circuit
1943) . The trial court in no way transgressed
its authority in filling in the omission and
making the record show what was true under the
law anyway. Its action was in conformity with
the well-established precept that mere lapse
of time will not prevent the court from
correcting errors or omissions.
We so
recognized in the recent case of Kettner v.
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, stating
that " * * * in proper circumstances where the
interests of justice so require, the court has
power to act nunc pro tunc, that is, to do an
act upon one date and make it effective as of
a prior date. It is recognized that clerical
errors may be corrected or omissions supplied
so the record will accurately reflect that
which in fact took place." To the same effect
see Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 195, 381
P.2d 78.
563 P.2d at

. Emphasis added.

If the obligation
(first) judgment

to pay

interest

"as a matter of
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follows

law", then

the

there

simply was no need to raise that issue at the first
appeal.

When

Judge

Wilkinson

refused

in

1998

following remand subsequent to the Court of Appeals
decision

to order the assessment of interest against

the purchase price to be paid (in 1998), the appealed
issue became "ripe".
The irony inherent in the objection of the Buyers
as to

the

"interest"

issue

is the

fact

that

they

struggled so hard to convince the Court of Appeals that
the "option" contract was enforceable, according to its
terms. The Court of Appeals accepted that argument and
so held. Now the Buyers want to ignore the "interest"
provisions.
The Buyers have not been harmed at all. They have
been

allowed

(since

1991)

to

live

in

the

house,

according to the "rental" provisions (i.e. payment of
$675 per month). Since 1996 they have been allowed
per the trial court's order

to live there rent-free.

In the intervening three years that this case has
taken

"on appeal", what

should

the purchase

price

actually be? Whether that purchase price reflects the
pre-1996 accruing interest "at 10 1/2% interest" as the
"option" contract clearly states

is one question.

Whether the "interest" applies to post-1996 interest is
a

second

and

totally

13

different

question.

The

Appellants are entitled to a judicial decision on both.
That Judge Wilkinson of the trial court in 1996
refused to require interest at the "10 1/2% interest"
as the

contract

clearly

provides

IS an

appealable

issue. [The "judgment" bears interest, "as a matter of
law", per Dairy Distributors,

supra.] That

for the

intervening three years (1996 to 1999) NO interest was
included in the purchase price to be paid (??) by the
Buyers hurry) is presently appealable!
The issue is NOT
characterize it
for

a

"sum

provisions

as the Buyers are prone to so

whether the judgment is "personal" or

certain";
of

the

THE

statute

ISSUE
will

is
be

whether

the

followed,

by

incorporating the "10 1/2% interest" which so readily
appears on the face of the

"option" agreement. The

original "agreement" and the "judgment", whether from
1996 OR 1998, it doesn't matter is specific enough!
Furthermore,

the

Buyers

should

not

be

entitled

to

profit from sloppy drafting of the "judgment".
If the "10 1/2% interest1^ phrase does not mean
exactly this result, then what does the phrase mean?
The parties

(in 1991)

obviously

had

intended

some

meaning for it! What simply does it mean? The Buyers,
having prevailed on the enforceability of the "option"
agreement, cannot now be heard
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to complain

if the

"option" is enforced according to its clear import!
The Buyers acknowledge [p. 12 of their brief] that
the "option agreement" provides for the assessment of
interest. The Sellers' explanation, however, as to when
that

interest

is

actually

invoked

is

not

only

confusing, but it is not supported in the Record (due
to the procedural context in which this case was
litigated and adjudicated by the trial court) . Further,
the Buyers' version

as to what

the

"at

10 1/2%

interest" means flies directly in the face of the
written agreement and the reasonable meaning of the
selected
Buyers do

language. It is ludicrous to assert

as

that the phrase only has meaning IF AND

WHEN a "contract purchase" was to be invoked! The whole
transaction was, in essence, "a contract purchase"
(whatever that term-of-art phrase might mean)!
The more logical, reasonable explanation as to the
meaning of the phrase "purchase price of $81,500 at 10
1/2% interest", particularly when coupled with the
"balloon payment" and "loan" phrases found later within
the text of the option agreement, is that the purchase
price was to increase over time: at 10 1/2% per year,
as the option went on. It makes absolutely no sense to
think otherwise! Why would any person sell a structure
for the same price five years LATER? The Sellers didn't
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intend such.
The

Sellers

written

and

the

provisions

Buyers

which

clearly

clearly

agreed

provide

to

that

"interest" is to accrue to the outstanding obligation,
until

it

is

actually

paid.

That

the

Buyers

have

voluntarily chosen to wait for almost THREE YEARS and
haven't yet paid the purchase price should invoke the
"interest"

provisions

specified

in

the

"option

agreement".
II
CLAIMED FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
AND
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
The instant appeal is not frivolous or filed in bad
faith.

The

Sellers

should

be

appellate decision on the

entitled

"10 1/2

to

have

an

interest" phrase

clearly contained within the "option" agreement. They
to this date have not had such a decision.
As far as the statements of the Buyers that the
appeal

has

attorney's

caused
fees

the

Buyers

and/or

to

to

wait

incur
to

additional

"close",

such

problems are of their own making.
As written, the 1998 judgment
appeal is taken

from which this

does NOT require the Sellers to do

anything. The "judgment" is clear: it unequivocally
states, in relevant part:
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1.
Plaintiffs are quieted in fee simple as
to the following described property . . .
Said real property shall hereby be quieted in
the Plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Ann (sic)
Clock, upon their deposit of the sum of
$76,500 plus the sum of $3,650 now held by the
court with Surety Title Company.
5.
Evidence of the quieting title in the
plaintiffs shall be sufficient upon the
recording of a notice by Surety Title Company
evidencing the deposit of the funds required
herein.
Emphasis added. All the Buyers [the Clocks] have to do
is deposit the money [$76,500 and the $3,650, held in
court] with Surety Title Company, record a "notice" and
the property is theirs! There is simply nothing for the
Sellers to do. Thus, the Buyers' assertions that the
resultant (from the appeal) delay is causing a "cloud
on

their

title"

[Summary

Disposition

Motion]

is

absolutely false, for legal and factual reasons!
The Court must remember, also, that the particular
"form" of the 1998 "judgment" was prepared solely by
Buyers' counsel. It apparently conforms to the trial
court's "decision", as Judge Wilkinson signed it. The
"judgment" (order) is operative, IMMEDIATELY: all the
Buyers have to do is deposit the money.
The fact that this Court might rule that they have
to pay "interest" at the "10 1/2% interest" rate as the
"option" agreement clearly specifies

might cause them

some discomfort in finally "closing" (by depositing the
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money with Surety Title Company), but that's not the
fault of the Greens. The "judgment" has been prepared
the way the Buyers' counsel wanted it; the Sellers are
not the cause of any delay as to the "closing".
The Buyers have changed their position: in the
present they seek to have the Court enforce the 1996
"judgment". And yet
Buyers

sought

(and

in the trial court below,
obtained)

introductory phrase of the 1998
Buyers had moved
granted.

for

other

relief.

the
The

"judgment" is that

"summary judgment", which was

[It is important to note that it is Buyers'

counsel who prepared the Order! It is Buyers who framed
up the issues in the trial court!] The Buyers-Appellees
have

NOT

filed

a

"cross-appeal"

(of

the

1998

"judgment") and now should not be heard to complain
about it.
Buyers have previously claimed [paragraph 3 of the
Wesley Clock

affidavit,

submitted with the

Summary

Disposition motion] that
"Surety Title informs us that they will not
insure title until the second appeal is
resolved. Thus, the Greens' have clouded the
title to the property to delay the closing."
[Paragraph

3

of

Wesley

Clock

affidavit.]

That's

absolutely incorrect. As written, the 1998 "judgment"
easily works through that contingency. The Sellers are
not required (by court order) to "close"; rather, the
18

vesting of title operates as a matter of law, by reason
of the Court's judgment! That the title company chosen
by

the

purchaser

(the

Clocks)

won't

insure

title

pending the second "appeal" is not the fault of the
Greens,

who

cannot

be

expected

to

give

up

their

appellate rights to have the "option" contract enforced
according to its terms. The Sellers are not "clouding"
the title. Nor is the "closing" delayed! The Buyers
merely
theirs.

need

to pay

the money

and

the property

is

[The instant "appeal" might have the result

that the Clocks might have to pay more than the $81,500
price they agreed to in 19 91, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE THAT
IS WHAT THE "OPTION" CONTRACT THEY SIGNED SAID WAS TO
HAPPEN!

That the purchase price would increase "at 10

1/2% interest". So when they finally pay in 1999 or
later

more

than

three years

after

the

1996

date

(which iss the absolute latest date contemplated by the
parties as to the transfer of the parcel), shouldn't
the Buyers pay the amount they agreed to? The Sellers
think so, and have filed this appeal to enforce the
contract, according to its terms.
It appears that Judge Wilkinson (and perhaps even
Buyers' counsel) framed up the 1998 "judgment" so as to
avoid a situation wherein the Sellers

represented by

other counsel, not counsel handling this appeal
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might

refuse to sign over the necessrry conveyances. The 1998
judgment

doesn't

require

that

they

do!

The

1998

"judgment" provides the quiet title vesting upon the
deposit of the Buyers' monies with Surety Title. Those
Buyers cannot now be heard to complain about "delay" or
"clouds on title", because

the vesting

of time

is

entirely within their control!
With respect to the sanctions the Buyers-Appellees
have

requested

and/or

the

this

Court

claimed

impose

"delay"

and

for

the

"cloud

"appeal"

on

effected

thereby,

those

same

arguments

essence,

advanced

before

Judge

Wilkinson.

title"

were,

in

However,

Judge Wilkinson's "minute entry", dated as of 6 August
1998, indicates that "sanctions are reserved".
1998

[See

"judgment", ATTACHMENT #2 to Sellers' original

brief.]

As heretofore stated, Buyers have not filed a

"cross-appeal" from the 1998 "judgment". Those Buyers
cannot now be heard to complain on those issues.
If there is a res judicata or "law of the case"
concept applicable to the instant situation, it is that
the Buyers cannot now be heard to complain about the
1998 "judgment". They procured it. They prepared it!
That

"j udgment"

in

procedure

and

substance

was

obviously designed to supersede and take the place of
the 1996 "judgment". The 1998 "judgment" is THE final
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judgment from which this appeal is properly perfected.
The Sellers should be allowed to raise the "interest"
issue which the trial court has failed to resolve.
In

each

appeal

the

Sellers

did

NOT

file

a

supersedeas bond to prevent the Buyers from complying
with the judgment. Thus, the fact that the instant
appeal has been filed has in no way, shape or form
harmed the Buyers in any particular! Their claim for
sanctions

and/or

an

award

of

attorney's

fees

is

inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The contractually-stated

"interest" follows the

judgment, "as a matter of law". Dairy Distributors,
supra. Thus,

there was no necessity

for the

first

appeal to address that issue. Only when Judge Wilkinson
refused to honor the contractual terms (in 1998) did it
become apparent that the issue arose, which prompted
this appeal. The Appellants should be entitled to have
the appellate court correct the trial court's error in
not so including that interest. The Court of Appeals
should award the Sellers their interest, at the "10
1/2%" per year rate, from 1991 but at least from 1996!
The Sellers' appeal is meritorious. The Buyers'
claim

for

attorney's

fees

incurred

on

appeal

is

improper. If there has been any deleterious effect upon
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the Buyers from the delay, that effect arises from
their own shortcomings in failing to follow the 1998
"judgment", as carefully crafted by the Court and as
prepared

by

that

counsel. The

Defendant's

are

not

obligated to do anything: title "vests" when the Buyers
deposit the money! It's that simple!
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 1999.
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